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Abstract. In the paper, we introduce and study generalized weighted influence indices of a coali-
tion on a player, where players have an ordered set of possible actions. Each player has an inclination
to choose one of the actions. Due to influence of a coalition of other players, a final decision of the
player may be different from his original inclination. An influence in such situations is measured by
the general weighted influence index. In a particular case, the decision of the player may be closer
to the inclination of the influencing coalition than his inclination was. The weighted influence index
which captures such a case is called the positive weighted influence index. We also consider the
negative weighted influence index, where a final decision of the player goes farther away from the
inclination of the influencing coalition. Some special cases of the weighted influence indices, called
a possibility influence index and an equidistributed influence index, are also defined. We consider
different influence functions and study their properties. A set of followers and a set of a conditional
followers of a given coalition are defined, and their properties are analyzed. We define the concepts
of success, decisiveness, luck, and failure for the multi-choice model of influence.
JEL Classification: C7, D7
Keywords: general weighted influence index, positive weighted influence index, negative
weighted influence index, influence function, follower of a coalition, success, decisiveness
1 Introduction
The point of departure of this paper is the concept of decisional power (the Hoede-Bakker
index) which has been proposed in [4], and later generalized and modified in [8]. In the
original framework, we consider a social network with players, also referred to as agents
or actors, who have to make an acceptance-rejection decision. In the original framework
it is assumed that each player has an inclination to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Then, each player
makes his yes-no decision which, due to influence of other players, may be different from
the original inclination of the player. Furthermore, a group decision is made. If we define
a success of a player as a probability that the player is successful, and a successful player
is defined as a player whose inclination coincides with the group decision, then we get the
following interpretation of the Hoede-Bakker index. If all inclination vectors are equally
probable, then the generalized Hoede-Bakker index is a kind of a ‘net’ Success (see [7]),
and moreover, the generalized Hoede-Bakker index coincides with the absolute Banzhaf
index; see [8]. Although the influence aspects incorporated into the social network make
the index especially attractive, both from theoretical and application point of view, there
is an essential drawback of the (generalized) Hoede-Bakker index. The main drawback of
the index is that the actual role of the influence function is hidden. In [3], a general form
of the index is proposed, called a global index, which enables the analysis of influence
among players. The global index is defined as a pair consisting of an influence index and
the revised Hoede-Bakker index. The authors define weighted influence indices and study
their properties. Several special cases of the weighted influence indices are considered, like
the possibility influence index, and the certainty influence index. Two kinds of influence,
a direct influence and an opposite influence, are studied. Under the direct influence, the
influencing coalition succeeds in making a player vote according to the inclination of the
coalition, while the inclination of the player was different from the inclination of the
coalition. The opposite influence of a coalition on a player means that the inclinations of
the player and the coalition coincide, but the player’s vote is different from this inclination.
The aim of the present paper is to enlarge the set of possible yes-no decisions to multi-
choice games (see e.g., [5], and also [2]), and to investigate the generalized influence
indices. In fact, we escape now from a voting situation, where players have to say either
‘yes’ or ‘no’. It is assumed that each player has a totally ordered set of possible actions, the
same for each player, and he has to choose one of the actions. A player has an inclination
to choose a particular action, but his decision may be different from the inclination, due
to the influence of other players. There is no outside event which could make a player
change his decision: only interactions between players take place. Consequently, if a player
decides differently from his original inclination, it may be seen as a unique result of the
influence between players. First, we propose a general form of the influence index for the
new framework, in which players have an ordered set of possible actions. The general
weighted (respectively general possibility) influence index is a natural generalization of
the weighted (respectively possibility) direct influence index defined for yes-no scheme in
[3]. Next, we analyze a positive influence, which measures how much a coalition attracts
a player, i.e., pulls the player’s vote near to the inclination of the coalition. A player who
has an inclination different from the inclination of a given coalition is influenced by this
coalition if his (final) decision is closer to the inclination of the coalition than his (original)
inclination was. We also investigate a negative influence. For each inclination vector in
which the members of a given coalition have the same inclination, there is one (or two)
action(s) which is (are) the most extreme action(s). These actions lie ‘farthest’ from the
inclination of the coalition. If the inclination of a player is different from the most extreme
action of the coalition, and his decision comes ‘closer’ to the extreme action, we say that
there is the negative influence of the coalition on the player. An opposite influence in the
yes-no model, which was investigated in [3], is a particular case of the negative influence:
the inclinations of the player and the coalition are the same, but the decision of the
player is different from the inclination of the coalition. When all actors make their final
decisions, a group decision is determined. Similar as in the original framework, we do not
restrict our analysis to one particular group decision function, but we allow for different
group decision functions.
In the set of possible actions, we display a set of ‘neutral actions’, which are defined
such that a coalition with the inclination to choose the neutral action has no ability to
influence a player. Hence, if a player decides differently from his inclination, it is assumed
to be NOT due to the influence of a coalition with the ‘neutral inclination’. One particular
case of the three-action model is a generalization of the original yes-no framework to a
yes-no-abstention scheme (see [2]), where each player has an inclination to say either ‘yes’
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(action +1), or ‘no’ (action -1), or to abstain (action 0). The abstention may be defined
as such a neutral action. It is then assumed that a coalition of abstaining players has no
influence ability, but the abstention may be a result of the influence.
In the paper, we consider the set of followers, where by a follower of a given coalition
of players we mean the agent who always decides according to the inclination of the
coalition in question. We also define the set of conditional followers, i.e., players who
follow a given coalition only if the coalition has an inclination to choose one particular
action. Moreover, different influence functions are defined and analyzed.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2 the generalized influence
indices are defined and studied. For simplicity reasons we do not add the word generalized
when defining and discussing the indices, but they all measure an influence in a more
general framework, and they are a generalized version of the ones considered in [3]. In
Section 3, we introduce the concepts of a follower of a coalition, a conditional follower,
and a purely influential function. Different influence functions and their properties are
investigated in Section 4. The notions of success, decisiveness, and related concepts are
considered in Section 5. In Section 6 we conclude. We also present several examples.
2 The generalized influence indices
The general framework is the following. We consider a social network with the set of
players (agents, actors) denoted by N = {1, ..., n}. There is a totally ordered set of
possible actions A, where ∞ > |A| ≥ 2. For simplicity we assume each action to be
an integer. Each player has an inclination to choose one of the actions. Hence, by the
inclination of a player we mean the action the player wants to choose. An inclination
vector, denoted by i, is an n-vector consisting of the actions of the players. Let I be the
set of all inclination vectors, I = An. It is assumed that players may influence each others,
and due to the influences in the network, the final decision of a player may be different
from his original inclination. In other words, each inclination vector i ∈ I is transformed
into a decision vector Bi, where B : I → Cn is the influence function, and C ⊆ A is the set
of possible decisions. The set of all influence functions will be denoted by B. The decision
vector Bi is an n-vector consisting of the decisions made by the players. Furthermore,
given G ⊆ A, the group decision function gd : Cn → G is introduced, having the value
a ∈ G if the group decision is to choose the action a. The set of all group decision functions
will be denoted by G. By assuming Cn instead of I in the influence function, and G ⊆ A
instead of A in the group decision function, we allow for the possibility that not all actions
in A can be chosen as the decision of a player and as the group decision. For instance, if
the actions in A are interpreted as degrees of inclination, which are between NO (denoted
by −1), ..., ‘maybe NOT’, ..., ‘maybe YES’, and YES (denoted by +1), then both the
decision (interpreted as the vote) and the group decision could be just one of the two
actions: either NO or YES.
In the set of all actions A, we distinguish the subset A0 ⊂ A, possibly empty, which is
the set of all neutral actions. A neutral action is defined as an action such that a coalition
with the inclination to choose the neutral action has no ability to influence a player. On
the other hand, a neutral action may be a result of the influence.
Remark 1 One can see immediately our model as a natural generalization of the original
yes-no model, which we simply define as A = {−1,+1} and A0 = ∅. Moreover, we capture
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a yes-no-abstention model by setting A = {−1, 0,+1} and A0 = {0} if we assume that an
abstaining coalition has no ability to influence. On the other hand, if a coalition with the
inclination to abstain is assumed to be able to influence a player, we can simply consider
a three-action model with A = {−1, 0,+1} and A0 = ∅.
Let us focus on the influence issue. Before formalizing the influence concepts, we
introduce several notations for convenience. First of all, cardinality of sets S, T, . . . will
be denoted by the corresponding lower case s, t, . . .. We omit braces for sets, e.g., {k,m},
N \ {j}, S ∪ {j} will be written km, N \ j, S ∪ j, etc.
We introduce for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ N the set
IS := {i ∈ I | ∀k, j ∈ S [ik = ij ∧ ik ∈ A \ A0]}. (1)
We denote by iS ∈ A \ A0 the value ik for some k ∈ S, i ∈ IS.
The concept of the influence adopted in Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 is related to the
concept of the direct influence of a coalition on a player defined in [3]. It is assumed that
the player’s inclination is different from the inclination of the coalition, and the player’s
decision differs from his inclination. Let for each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S
IS→j := {i ∈ IS | ij 6= iS} (2)
I∗S→j(B) := {i ∈ IS→j | (Bi)j 6= ij}. (3)
IS→j and I∗S→j(B) denote the set of all inclination vectors of potential influence of S on
j, and the set of all inclination vectors of observed influence of S on j under given B ∈ B,
respectively.
2.1 The general influence indices
First, we can define the weighted influence indices as they were defined for the yes-no
model in [3]. We will call them the general influence indices. For each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S
and i ∈ IS→j, we introduce a weight αS→ji ∈ [0, 1] of influence of coalition S on j ∈ N \S
under the inclination vector i ∈ IS→j. We assume that for each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S,
there exists i ∈ IS→j such that αS→ji > 0. Moreover, we impose a kind of the symmetry
assumption that αS→ji depends solely on numbers n
a(S, j, i), for a ∈ A\(A0∪{ij}), where
na(S, j, i) is the number of players with the inclination to choose action a ∈ A\(A0∪{ij})
under i ∈ IS→j, i.e., for each S ⊆ N , j /∈ S, i ∈ IS→j, and a ∈ A \ (A0 ∪ {ij}),
na(S, j, i) := |{m ∈ N \ j | im = a}| (4)
Definition 1 Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, the general weighted influence
index of coalition S on player j is defined as
dα(B, S → j) :=
∑
i∈I∗S→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
∈ [0, 1]. (5)
Moreover, the general possibility influence index of coalition S on player j is given by
d(B, S → j) = dα(B, S → j) (6)
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where αS→ji = 1 for each i ∈ IS→j, (7)
and the general equidistributed influence index of coalition S on player j is given by
d∗(B, S → j) = dα∗(B, S → j) (8)
where α∗S→ji =
1∑
a∈A\(A0∪{ij}) (2
na(S,j,i) − 1) for each i ∈ IS→j. (9)
Note that the general possibility influence index of coalition S on player j is then
equal to
d(B, S → j) := |I
∗
S→j(B)|
|IS→j| ∈ [0, 1]. (10)
For the equidistributed influence index, for each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, i ∈ IS→j, and
for each a ∈ A \ (A0 ∪ {ij}) we count the number of all p-player coalitions of the set
{m ∈ N \ j | im = a}, where p = 1, ..., na(S, j, i), which gives
na(S,j,i)∑
p=1
(
na(S, j, i)
p
)
= 2n
a(S,j,i) − 1.
As one can see, players having either the same inclination as the influenced player or the
inclination to choose a neutral action, are not considered as responsible for the influence.
2.2 The positive influence indices
The concept of the general influence index seems to be sufficient to register just the fact
of the influence between players, since it considers all cases when a player’s decision is dif-
ferent from his inclination. Nevertheless, the general influence index does not distinguish
‘how much’ a player changes his ‘position’. In the yes-no framework, if a player votes
differently than his inclination was, the change is defined uniquely, since there are only
two possibilities: ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In the model with an ordered set of possible actions, we
can observe more than just the changes, i.e., we have also an information about different
distances between actions. Consequently, in the generalized model with an ordered set
of possible actions, we need to introduce a more sophisticated measure of the influence.
Given coalition S ⊂ N , player j /∈ S, and inclination vector i ∈ IS→j, there is a certain
(positive) distance |ij − iS| between ij and iS. Under the influence, the decision (Bi)j of
player j may be different from his inclination, and what we can also measure is a distance
|(Bi)j − iS| between the decision of the player and the inclination of the coalition. Did
the coalition succeed in making the player ‘put’ his decision closer to the inclination of
the coalition? Consequently, for each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, and B ∈ B, we can define the
set of all inclination vectors of positive influence as
IposS→j(B) := {i ∈ IS→j | |(Bi)j − iS| ≤ |ij − iS|}. (11)
Definition 2 Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, the positive weighted influence
index of coalition S on player j is defined as
Dα(B, S → j) :=
∑
i∈IposS→j(B) [|ij − iS| − |(Bi)j − iS|]α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j |ij − iS|α
S→j
i
∈ [0, 1]. (12)
5
The positive possibility influence index of coalition S on player j is given by
D(B, S → j) = Dα(B, S → j) (13)
where αS→ji = 1 for each i ∈ IS→j, (14)
and the positive equidistributed influence index of coalition S on player j is given by
D∗(B, S → j) = Dα∗(B, S → j) (15)
where α∗S→ji =
1∑
a∈A\(A0∪{ij}) (2
na(S,j,i) − 1) for each i ∈ IS→j. (16)
Remark 2 Given B ∈ B, S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, if for each i ∈ IposS→j(B), the decision of
player j ‘lies’ between his inclination and the inclination of coalition S, i.e., if for each
i ∈ IposS→j(B)
|ij − iS| = |(Bi)j − ij|+ |(Bi)j − iS|
then the positive weighted influence index of coalition S on player j is equal to
Dα(B, S → j) :=
∑
i∈IposS→j(B) |(Bi)j − ij|α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j |ij − iS|α
S→j
i
. (17)
Remark 3 Note that if for a certain i ∈ IS, ij 6= iS, but |(Bi)j − iS| > |ij − iS|, the
difference |ij − iS| for such an i is included in the denominator of equation (12), but we
write just 0 in the nominator of equation (12), since i /∈ IposS→j(B).
Remark 4 Note that we do not distinguish between two situations in which the decisions
of the influenced player are different, but their distances from the inclination of the
coalition are the same. Let us consider the situation mentioned above, in which the
decision of the influenced player ‘lies’ between his inclination and the inclination of the
coalition. Next, let us imagine that the influenced player ‘puts’ his decision on the ‘other
side’ of the inclination of the coalition, farther from his own inclination, but the distance
between the decision and the inclination of the coalition is the same as before. If this
holds for each i ∈ IposS→j(B), we get the same positive weighted influence index of the
coalition on the player.
Fact 1 Given B ∈ B, S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, if D(B, S → j) = 1, then d(B, S → j) = 1.
Proof: Suppose D(B, S → j) = 1. This means that∑
i∈IposS→j(B)
[|ij − iS| − |(Bi)j − iS|] =
∑
i∈IS→j
|ij − iS| (18)
For each i ∈ IS→j, either i ∈ IposS→j(B), or |ij − iS| < |(Bi)j − iS|. By virtue of (18), if
i ∈ IposS→j(B), then |(Bi)j−iS| = 0, and therefore (Bi)j = iS 6= ij. If |ij−iS| < |(Bi)j−iS|,
then from (18) |ij − iS| = 0, and therefore ij = iS and |(Bi)j − iS| > 0. This means that
(Bi)j 6= iS = ij. Hence, for each i ∈ IS→j, (Bi)j 6= ij, which gives I∗S→j(B) = IS→j. 
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2.3 The negative influence indices
The concept of the influence adopted in this subsection is related to the opposite influence
of a coalition on a player in the yes-no model defined in [3]. Under the opposite influence
in the yes-no model, the inclinations of the coalition and the player coincide, but the
decision of the player differs from his inclination. When measuring a negative influence
of a coalition on a player in the model with an ordered set of possible actions, we look
for the inclination vectors, in which the inclination of the player is different from the
action(s) placed farthest from the inclination of the coalition. If the decision of the player
is farther from the inclination of the coalition than his inclination was, we say that such an
inclination vector is the inclination vector of (observed) negative influence of the coalition
on the player. Of course, the goal of the influencing coalition in the case of the negative
influence is different from the goal of such a coalition in the case of the positive influence.
While in the case of the positive influence, the coalition tries to ‘attract’ the player’s
decision as close to its inclination as possible, when considering the negative influence,
the goal of the coalition is to push the decision of the player as far from its inclination as
possible.
Below, we formalize the concepts of the negative influence. For each a ∈ A \ A0, we
define
M(a) := {a˜ ∈ A | a˜ = argmax
a′∈A
|a− a′|}. (19)
Of course, |M(a)| ∈ {1, 2}. In particular, for each S ⊆ N and i ∈ IS, the coalition S has
its inclination iS, and then M(iS) is the set of all possible actions which are the farthest
actions from the inclination iS, and M(iS) may have either 1 or 2 elements.
For each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, the set of all inclination vectors of potential negative
influence of S on j is defined as
I˜S→j := {i ∈ IS | ij /∈M(iS)}. (20)
For each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, B ∈ B, and i ∈ I˜S→j
i˜
ij
S := arg min
i˜S∈M(iS)
|ij − i˜S| (21)
i˜
(Bi)j
S := arg min
i˜S∈M(iS)
|(Bi)j − i˜S|. (22)
Of course, if |M(iS)| = 1, then i˜ijS = i˜(Bi)jS .
The set of all inclination vectors of observed negative influence of S on j is defined as
I˜negS→j(B) := {i ∈ I˜S→j | |ij − i˜ijS | > |(Bi)j − i˜(Bi)jS |}. (23)
In a similar way as before, for each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S and i ∈ I˜S→j, we introduce a
weight αS→ji ∈ [0, 1] of influence of coalition S on j ∈ N \ S under the inclination vector
i ∈ I˜S→j, where αS→ji depends now on numbers na(S, j, i), for a ∈ A \ A0.
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Definition 3 Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N , j ∈ N \ S, the negative weighted influence
index of coalition S on player j is defined as
Dnegα (B, S → j) :=
∑
i∈I˜negS→j(B)
[
|ij − i˜ijS | − |(Bi)j − i˜(Bi)jS |
]
αS→ji∑
i∈I˜S→j |ij − i˜
ij
S |αS→ji
∈ [0, 1]. (24)
The negative possibility influence index of coalition S on player j is given by
D
neg
(B, S → j) :=
∑
i∈I˜negS→j(B)
[
|ij − i˜ijS | − |(Bi)j − i˜(Bi)jS |
]
∑
i∈I˜S→j |ij − i˜
ij
S |
∈ [0, 1]. (25)
2.4 The Examples
The aim of this section is to show a broad applicability of the generalized framework
and the influence indices that are studied in the paper. Several examples are mentioned
below, while for two of them we calculate all concepts introduced in the paper.
Example 1 One of the natural applications of the model with an ordered set of actions
is an application to politics, in particular to elections. An ideological line indicating a
political orientation, from the Left Wing via the Centre to the Right Wing candidates or
parties, has its natural interpretation here. Let us consider a French family before the first
round of French presidential elections in Spring 2007. We assume that the family members
consider to vote for one of three candidates, i.e., using the terminology of our model, each
player has an inclination to choose one of the three actions: to vote for Segole`ne Royal
(Action −1), to vote for Francois Bayrou (Action 0), or to vote for Nicolas Sarkozy
(Action +1). Consequently, neither abstaining nor voting for a candidate different from
the three major ones is included in the set of possible actions of the family members.
This situation is then modeled as a three-action model, but with the empty set of neutral
actions, A = {−1, 0,+1}, A0 = ∅. One can imagine here many kinds of an influence: the
influence of the parents on the children, the influence of the husband on the wife, etc. Of
course, the analysis would end at the stage of calculating the influence indices, since the
group decision is determined on the country level, not on a family level.
Example 2 As mentioned before, a particular case of our generalized framework is a
yes-no-abstention model, in which each player has an inclination either to say ‘yes’ or
‘no’, or to abstain. Let us check how the concepts and formulas introduced above look
like for this three-action example. We have A = {−1, 0,+1} = C, A0 = {0},
IS = {i ∈ I | ∀k, j ∈ S [ik = ij ∧ ik 6= 0}
IS→j = {i ∈ IS | ij 6= iS}
I∗S→j(B) = {i ∈ IS→j | (Bi)j 6= ij}
αS→ji depends on the number n
iS(S, j, i), where
niS(S, j, i) = |{m ∈ N \ j | im = iS}|
8
dα(B, S → j) =
∑
i∈I∗S→j(B) α
S→j
i∑
i∈IS→j α
S→j
i
d(B, S → j) =
|I−0−S→j(B)|+ |I−+0S→j(B)|+ |I+0+S→j(B)|+ |I+−0S→j(B)|+ |I−+−S→j (B)|+ |I+−+S→j (B)|+ |I−0+S→j(B)|+ |I+0−S→j(B)|
4 · 3n−s−1
where for a ∈ {−1,+1}, b, c ∈ {−1, 0,+1}
IabcS→j(B) := {i ∈ IS | iS = a ∧ ij = b ∧ (Bi)j = c}
d∗(B, S → j) = dα∗(B, S → j), where α∗S→ji =
1
2n
iS (S,j,i) − 1
D(B, S → j) =
|I−0−S→j(B)|+ |I−+0S→j(B)|+ |I+0+S→j(B)|+ |I+−0S→j(B)|+ 2
(|I−+−S→j (B)|+ |I+−+S→j (B)|)
2 · 3n−s
For a ∈ {−1,+1}, M(a) = {−a}
I˜S→j = {i ∈ IS | |ij − iS| ∈ {0, 1}}
i˜
ij
S = i˜
(Bi)j
S = −iS
I˜negS→j(B) = {i ∈ IS | |ij + iS| > |(Bi)j + iS|}
D
neg
(B, S → j) =
|I−0+S→j(B)|+ |I−−0S→j(B)|+ |I+0−S→j(B)|+ |I++0S→j(B)|+ 2
(|I−−+S→j (B)|+ |I++−S→j (B)|)
2 · 3n−s
Example 3 Let us consider the following example entitled ‘Old or New’. A three-member
committee is to choose a new researcher for a research lab. There is one position available,
and two applicants. The committee consists of a director of the lab (player 1), and two
professors who chair two different sections. The candidates have different research profiles:
one candidate does research which coincides with the expertise of the lab, while research
program of another candidate is far from topics the lab works on. The committee members
use a criterion ‘publication rate in a new research field’. Consequently, each committee
member must choose one of the following three actions that we place on the criterion
line:
– to choose candidate Mr. Old (Action−1) - this candidate would bring new publications
in some fields of the expertise of the lab, but clearly would not bring to the lab any
publications in a new research field;
– to choose nobody (to abstain - Action 0) - the publications of the lab would remain
the same; or
– to choose candidate Mr. New (Action +2) - this candidate would bring to the lab
many publications in a new research field.
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Each committee member has an inclination to choose one of the actions, but due to some
influence of the others, he can vote differently than he preliminary felt like. It is assumed
that the director of the lab always votes according to his preliminary inclination. If the
director and another professor both want to choose the same candidate, Mr. Old or Mr.
New, the remaining colleague will follow their inclination. The boss influences on his own
a colleague with the inclination to abstain, but an abstaining committee member (also
the director) has no ability to influence the others.
Using the notation introduced in the paper, we have the committee (the set of players)
N = {1, 2, 3}, the set of actions A = {−1, 0,+2} = C, and the abstention as the neutral
action A0 = {0}. Moreover, there are 27 possible inclination vectors, |I| = 27. Table 1
shows the inclination vectors and the decision vectors.
Table 1. The inclination and decision vectors
i ∈ I Bi i ∈ I Bi i ∈ I Bi
(−1,−1,−1) (−1,−1,−1) (0, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) (2, 2, 2) (2, 2, 2)
(−1,−1, 0) (−1,−1,−1) (0, 0,−1) (0, 0,−1) (2, 2,−1) (2, 2, 2)
(−1, 0,−1) (−1,−1,−1) (0,−1, 0) (0,−1, 0) (2,−1, 2) (2, 2, 2)
(0,−1,−1) (0,−1,−1) (−1, 0, 0) (−1,−1,−1) (−1, 2, 2) (−1, 2, 2)
(−1,−1, 2) (−1,−1,−1) (0, 0, 2) (0, 0, 2) (2, 2, 0) (2, 2, 2)
(−1, 2,−1) (−1,−1,−1) (0, 2, 0) (0, 2, 0) (2, 0, 2) (2, 2, 2)
(2,−1,−1) (2,−1,−1) (2, 0, 0) (2, 2, 2) (0, 2, 2) (0, 2, 2)
(−1, 0, 2) (−1,−1, 2) (0,−1, 2) (0,−1, 2) (2,−1, 0) (2,−1, 2)
(−1, 2, 0) (−1, 2,−1) (0, 2,−1) (0, 2,−1) (2, 0,−1) (2, 2,−1)
Note that for S ⊆ {2, 3}, Dα(B, S → 1) = 0, because (Bi)1 = i1 for each i ∈ I. The
positive and general possibility influence indices are as follows:
D(B, 1→ 2) = D(B, 1→ 3) = 5
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, d(B, 1→ 2) = d(B, 1→ 3) = 2
3
D(B, 2→ 3) = D(B, 3→ 2) = d(B, 2→ 3) = d(B, 3→ 2) = 1
3
D(B, 12→ 3) = D(B, 13→ 2) = d(B, 12→ 3) = d(B, 13→ 2) = 1.
When considering, for instance, the influence of player 1 on player 2, we verify 12
inclination vectors in which player 1’s inclination is both different from 0 and different
from player 2’s inclination. In the case of 8 out of these 12 inclination vectors, player 2
votes differently than his inclination was. Note however that the influence has different
strength. For instance, when we look at the inclination vectors (−1, 0,−1) and (−1, 2,−1),
in both cases the decision vector is equal to (−1,−1,−1). Nevertheless, in the first case,
player 2 has moved only from 0 to −1, while in the second case, he changed from 2 to
−1.
There are two cases, related to the calculations of the influence index of player 2
on player 3, which illustrate Remark 3. Let us look at the inclination vectors (−1, 2, 0)
and (2,−1, 0). Since the inclinations of player 2 and player 3 are different, we include
the differences |2 − 0| = 2 and | − 1 − 0| = 1 in the denominator of D(B, 2 → 3), and
just 1 and 1 in the denominator of d(B, 2 → 3). Nevertheless, since player 3 moved his
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decision farther from the inclination of player 2, these cases are not seen as a positive
influence of player 2 on player 3, and consequently 0 and 0 are written in the nominators
of D(B, 2→ 3) and d(B, 2→ 3).
We calculate also the negative possibility influence indices which, in most cases except
two indices, are equal to 0. The positive values of these indices are equal to:
D
neg
(B, 2→ 3) = Dneg(B, 3→ 2) = (1− 0) + (2− 0)
27
=
1
9
.
For instance, the inclination vector (−1, 2, 0) leads to the decision vector (−1, 2,−1),
which counts for the negative influence of player 2 on player 3. Both in the denominator
and the nominator of D
neg
(B, 2 → 3) we write 1: the farthest action of player 2 with
the inclination 2 is −1, which is of a distance equal to 1 from the neutral inclination
of player 3, and player 3 decides for the action −1. Moreover, the inclination vector
(2,−1, 0) leads to the decision vector (2,−1, 2), and we write 2 both in the denominator
and the nominator of D
neg
(B, 2 → 3). Nevertheless, we should be aware that although
the negative influence index of player 2 on player 3 has a positive value, it is rather due
to the positive influence of player 1 on player 3. As it was described before, player 1
has the ability to make an abstaining player decide according to the inclination of player
1. In both inclination vectors (−1, 2, 0) and (2,−1, 0), the inclinations of players 1 and
2 are as far from each other as possible. In a similar way we can analyze the case of
D
neg
(B, 3→ 2).
Example 4 The same committee of the research lab might also be deciding about a
new budget to invite speakers for external seminars. The actions are placed on the line
‘changing the seminar budget’:
– Action −1 - to decrease the present seminar budget by 1000 euro;
– Action 0 - to keep the seminar budget unchanged;
– Action +2 - to increase the present seminar budget by 2000 euro.
Contrary to the previous example, one could imagine an abstaining coalition to have an
influence on the other(s), i.e., we have here A = {−1, 0,+2} = C, but A0 = ∅. Given
Table 1, the influence indices will be, of course, different from the ones calculated in
Example 3, since we also take into account now all inclination vectors with Action 0 as
the inclination of a coalition.
3 Following a coalition
In this section, we focus on the positive influence. One of the concepts related to the
positive influence is the concept of a follower of a given coalition, that is, a voter who
always follows the inclination of the coalition in question. We assume that C = A.
Definition 4 Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and B ∈ B. The set of followers of S under B is defined
as
FB(S) := {j ∈ N | ∀i ∈ IS [(Bi)j = iS]}. (26)
For each a ∈ A \ A0, the set of conditional a-followers of S under B is defined as
FB(S|iS = a) := {j ∈ N | ∀i ∈ IS [iS = a⇒ (Bi)j = a]}. (27)
11
We have then ⋂
a∈A\A0
FB(S|iS = a) = FB(S)
Proposition 1 Let B ∈ B. Then the following holds:
(i) Whenever S ∩ T = ∅, FB(S) ∩ FB(T ) = ∅.
(ii) FB is an isotone function (S ⊆ S ′ implies FB(S) ⊆ FB(S ′)).
Consequently, if FB(N) = ∅, then FB ≡ ∅.
(iii) For each j ∈ FB(S) \ S, Dα(B, S → j) = 1, and Dnegα (B, S → j) = 0.
Proof: (i) Since S ∩ T = ∅, IS ∩ IT strictly includes IS∪T . Then there exists i ∈ IS ∩ IT
such that iS 6= iT . Hence, if j ∈ FB(S)∩FB(T ), the equality (Bi)j = iS = iT cannot hold
for this i.
(ii) Take S ⊆ S ′ and j ∈ FB(S). i ∈ IS′ implies i ∈ IS by antitonicity, hence (Bi)j = iS
by hypothesis, and since iS = iS′ , j ∈ FB(S ′).
(iii) Let B ∈ B, S ⊂ N , FB(S) 6= ∅, and j ∈ FB(S)\S. Hence, for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)j = iS,
and therefore Dα(B, S → j) = 1, and Dnegα (B, S → j) = 0. 
Assume FB is not identically the empty set. Then the kernel of B is the following
collection of sets:
K(B) := {S ∈ 2N | FB(S) 6= ∅, and S ′ ⊂ S ⇒ FB(S ′) = ∅}.
The kernel is well defined due to isotonicity. It is the set of “true” influential coalitions.
Definition 5 Let S, T be two disjoint non empty subsets of N . B is said to be a purely
influential function of S upon T if it satisfies for all i ∈ IS:
(Bi)j =
{
iS if j ∈ T
ij otherwise.
(28)
The set of such functions is denoted BS→T .
Note that these functions are arbitrary on I \ IS. What is the cardinality of BS→T ?
We have
|BS→T | = |A|n(|A|s−|A|+|A0|)|A|n−s (29)
Proposition 2 Let S, T be two disjoint non empty subsets of N . Then the following
holds:
(i) For all B ∈ BS→T , FB(S) = S ∪ T .
(ii) For each B ∈ BS→T and j ∈ N \ S, Dnegα (B, S → j) = 0, and
Dα(B, S → j) =
{
1 if j ∈ T
0 if j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ) (30)
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Proof: (i) Take t ∈ S ∪ T . If t ∈ T , then for any i ∈ IS, (Bi)t = iS. If t ∈ S, then for
any i ∈ IS, (Bi)t = it = iS. Hence t ∈ FB(S). On the other hand, take t ∈ FB(S). Then
for any i ∈ IS, (Bi)t = iS, and hence t ∈ S ∪ T .
(ii) Let B ∈ BS→T . Then for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)j = iS for j ∈ T , and (Bi)j = ij for j /∈ T .
Since IS→j ⊂ IS, we have for each i ∈ IS→j, (Bi)j = iS for j ∈ T , and (Bi)j = ij for j /∈ T .
Hence, if j ∈ T , then Dα(B, S → j) = 1, and if j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T ), then Dα(B, S → j) = 0.
Moreover, for each j ∈ N \ S, Dnegα (B, S → j) = 0. 
Example 5 The sets of followers for Example 3 presented in Section 2.4 are the following:
FB(∅) = FB(2) = FB(3) = ∅, FB(1) = {1}
FB(23) = {2, 3}, FB(12) = FB(13) = FB(123) = {1, 2, 3}
The sets of a-conditional followers are here the same as the sets of followers, i.e., for
a ∈ {−1, 2}, and S ⊂ {1, 2, 3}, FB(S|iS = a) = FB(S).
The kernel K(B) = {{1}, {2, 3}}. Moreover, B ∈ B12→3 ∩ B13→2.
4 The influence functions
Next, we define several influence functions B ∈ B and investigate their properties. In
particular, for each influence function analyzed, we determine the set of followers and the
values of the (positive and negative) weighted influence indices.
Some simple examples of influence functions are:
(i) The Majority function. Let n ≥ t > bn
2
c, and introduce for any i ∈ I and a ∈ A\A0,
the set
ia := {k ∈ N | ik = a}. (31)
The majority influence function Maj[t] ∈ B is defined by
(
Maj[t]i
)
j
:=
{
a, if ∃a ∈ A \ A0 [|ia| ≥ t]
ij, otherwise
, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ N. (32)
If a majority of players have an inclination a, then all players decide for a. If not, each
player decides according to his own inclination.
(ii) The Guru function. Let k˜ ∈ N be a particular player called the guru. The guru
influence function Gur[k˜] ∈ B is defined by
(Gur[k˜]i)j = ik˜, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ N. (33)
When a guru exists, every player follows always the guru.
(iii) The identity function Id ∈ B is defined by
Idi = i, ∀i ∈ I. (34)
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(iv) The mass psychology effect. Let t ∈ (0, n] and a ∈ A \ A0. Functions B ∈ B
satisfying for each i ∈ I
if |ia| ≥ t, then (Bi)a ⊇ ia (35)
are called mass psychology influence functions. If there is a sufficiently high number
of players with inclination a, no of these players will decide differently than a. We
denote by B[a,t] the set of such influence functions.
We list some basic properties of the influence functions mentioned.
Proposition 3 Let n ≥ t > bn
2
c and consider the majority function Maj[t]. Then the
following holds:
(i) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s ≥ t, and for each j ∈ N \ S,
Dα(Maj
[t], S → j) = 1, and Dnegα (Maj[t], S → j) = 0
(ii) For each S ⊆ N ,
FMaj[t](S) =

N, if s ≥ t
S, if n− t < s < t
∅, if s ≤ n− t.
(36)
(iii) The kernel is K(Maj[t]) = {S ⊆ N | |S| = n− t+ 1}.
Proof: (i) Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that s ≥ t, and j ∈ N \ S. For each i ∈ IS, there
is a ∈ A \ A0 such that iS = a, and therefore |ia| ≥ s ≥ t. Hence, (Maj[t]i)j = a = iS for
each i ∈ IS, which gives Dα(Maj[t], S → j) = 1, and Dnegα (Maj[t], S → j) = 0.
(ii) Let S ⊆ N be such that s ≥ t. Suppose that FMaj[t](S) 6= N . Then there exists j ∈ N
such that j /∈ FMaj[t](S). Hence, there is i˜ ∈ IS such that (Maj[t]˜i)j 6= i˜S. But i˜S = a for
certain a ∈ A \ A0, and |˜ia| ≥ s ≥ t. Hence, (Maj[t]˜i)j = a = i˜S, a contradiction.
Let S ⊆ N be such that n − t < s < t, and therefore s < t and n − s < t. Hence, for
each i ∈ IS, either there exists a ∈ A \ A0 such that |ia| ≥ t and iS = a, and hence
(Maj[t]i)j = a = iS for each j ∈ N , or (Maj[t]i)j = ij for each j ∈ N .
Note that S ⊆ FMaj[t](S), because if j ∈ S, then for each i ∈ IS, either (Maj[t]i)j = iS or
(Maj[t]i)j = ij = iS.
Suppose FMaj[t](S) 6⊆ S. Hence, there is k /∈ S such that k ∈ FMaj[t](S), and therefore for
each i ∈ IS, (Maj[t]i)k = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S 6= i˜k = i˜j for each j /∈ S. Then we
have (Maj[t]˜i)k = i˜k 6= i˜S, a contradiction.
Let S ⊆ N be such that s ≤ n − t. Suppose that FMaj[t](S) 6= ∅, and let j˜ ∈ FMaj[t](S).
Hence, for each i ∈ IS, (Maj[t]i)j˜ = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S 6= i˜k = a for each
k /∈ S and certain a ∈ A \ A0. Hence, |˜ia| = n − s ≥ t, and therefore for each j ∈ N ,
(Maj[t]˜i)j = a 6= i˜S, a contradiction.
(iii) By virtue of (36), we have the following. If |S| ≤ n− t, then FMaj[t](S) = ∅, and hence
S /∈ K(Maj[t]). If |S| = n − t + 1, then FMaj[t](S) = S, but for each S ′ ⊂ S, |S ′| ≤ n − t,
and therefore FMaj[t](S
′) = ∅. Hence, S ∈ K(Maj[t]). If |S| > n− t+1, then FMaj[t](S) 6= ∅,
and there exists S ′ ⊂ S such that |S ′| ≥ n − t + 1, which means that FMaj[t](S ′) 6= ∅.
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Hence, S /∈ K(Maj[t]). 
Proposition 4 Let k˜ ∈ N and consider the guru influence function Gur[k˜]. Then the
following holds:
(i) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that k˜ ∈ S, and for each j ∈ N \ (S ∪ {k˜}),
Dα(Gur
[k˜], S → j) = 1, and Dnegα (Gur[k˜], S → j) = 0.
(ii) For each S ⊆ N ,
F
Gur[k˜]
(S) =
{
N, if k˜ ∈ S
∅, if k˜ /∈ S. (37)
(iii) The kernel is K(Gur[k˜]) = {k˜}.
(iv) Gur[k˜] is the unique purely influential function of k˜ upon N \k˜, i.e., Bk˜→N\k˜ = {Gur[k˜]}.
Proof: (iv) Gur[k˜] ∈ Bk˜→N\k˜ comes immediately from (28) and (33). Now, Bk˜→N\k˜ is
reduced to a singleton since I \ Ik˜ = ∅.
(i) Let ∅ 6= S ⊆ N be such that k˜ ∈ S, and j ∈ N \ S. Hence, in particular for each
i ∈ IS, (Gur[k˜]i)j = ik˜ = iS, which gives Dα(Gur[k˜], S → j) = 1. Moreover, I˜negS→j(B) = ∅,
ad therefore Dnegα (Gur
[k˜], S → j) = 0.
(ii) The first line can be deduced from the fact that F
[k˜]
Gur is an isotone function and from
Prop. 2 (i) since Gur[k˜] is purely influential by (iv).
Let S ⊆ N be such that k˜ /∈ S. Suppose that F
Gur[k˜]
(S) 6= ∅. Let j˜ ∈ F
Gur[k˜]
(S). Hence,
for each i ∈ IS, (Gur[k˜]i)j˜ = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S 6= i˜k. Hence, for each j ∈ N ,
(Gur[k˜]˜i)j = i˜k˜ 6= i˜S, and in particular, (Gur[k˜]˜i)j˜ = i˜k˜ 6= i˜S, a contradiction.
(iii) clear from (37). 
Proposition 5 Let us consider the identity function Id. Then the following holds:
(i) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, Dα(Id, S → j) = Dnegα (Id, S → j) = 0.
(ii) For each S ⊆ N , FId(S) = S.
(iii) The kernel is K(Id) = {{k}, k ∈ N}.
Proof: (i) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, (Bi)j = ij for i ∈ I, and therefore
Dα(Id, S → j) = 0, and Dnegα (Id, S → j) = 0.
(ii) Note that S ⊆ FId(S), because if j ∈ S, then in particular for each i ∈ IS, (Idi)j =
ij = iS. Suppose FId(S) 6⊆ S. Hence, there is k /∈ S such that k ∈ FId(S), and therefore
for each i ∈ IS, (Idi)k = iS. Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S 6= i˜k. Then we have (Id˜i)k = i˜S 6= i˜k,
but Id˜i = i˜, a contradiction.
(iii) Clear from (ii). 
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Proposition 6 Let t ∈ (0, n] and a ∈ A\A0 be fixed, and consider any influence function
B in B[a,t]. Then the following holds:
(i) There exists B ∈ B[a,t] such that for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S,
Dα(Id, S → j) = Dnegα (Id, S → j) = 0. (38)
(ii) For each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s > n− t, t > 1, and j ∈ N \ S, there exists B ∈ B[a,t]
such that
Dα(B, S → j) = 1. (39)
(iii) For each S ⊆ N ,
FB(S) ⊆ S if s ≤ n− t. (40)
Moreover, there exists B ∈ B[a,t] such that for each S ⊆ N , FB(S) = S.
Proof: (i) Remark that Id ∈ B[a,t] for any a ∈ A \ A0 and any t ∈ (0, n]. By virtue of
Proposition 5, (i), we get Dα(Id, S → j) = 0 and Dnegα (Id, S → j) = 0 for each ∅ 6= S ⊆ N
and j ∈ N \ S.
(ii) Take arbitrary ∅ 6= S ⊆ N such that s > n− t, t > 1, and j /∈ S. Define B as follows:
(Bi)k =
{
iS, if i ∈ IS→j and k = j
ik, otherwise
Note that B belongs to B[a,t], because if i ∈ Ia′S→j for a′ 6= a, where
Ia
′
S→j = {i ∈ IS→j | iS = a′}
then |ia| < t, and if i ∈ I \ Ia′S→j, then (35) is satisfied. We have Dα(B, S → j) = 1.
(iii) Let t ∈ (0, n], a ∈ A \ A0, and s ≤ n − t. Suppose there is B ∈ B[a,t] such that
FB(S) 6⊆ S for a certain S ⊆ N . This means that FB(S) 6= ∅, since ∅ ⊆ S for each S.
Hence, there is k /∈ S such that k ∈ FB(S). This means that for each i ∈ IS, (Bi)k = iS.
Take i˜ ∈ IS such that i˜S 6= a, i˜k = a, and |˜ia| ≥ t. Such an i˜ always exists, because
n − s ≥ t. We have (Bi˜)k = i˜S 6= a, and therefore (˜i)a 6⊆ (Bi˜)a. But since |˜ia| ≥ t, we
should have (˜i)a ⊆ (Bi˜)a, a contradiction.
If we take B = Id, then for each S ⊆ N , FId(S) = S. 
5 On Success, Failure, and Decisiveness
In this section we generalize the concepts of Success, Decisiveness, Luck, and Failure of a
player (see [6] and [3]) for the multi-choice model, by introducing a parameter β, where
β ≤ max
a∈C,a′∈G
|a− a′|. (41)
Consequently, we consider β-Success, β-Failure, β-Luck, and β-Decisiveness, where for
instance β-Success of a player is defined as a probability that the player is β-successful,
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meaning that a ‘distance’ between his decision and the group decision is not greater than
β. β-Failure of a player is a probability that the player is not β-successful, i.e., a ‘distance’
between his decision and the group decision is greater than β. A player is β-decisive if
he is β-successful, and under an arbitrary change of his decision, a distance between
his new decision and the (new) group decision is not greater than the distance between
the preliminary decision and the resulting group decision. A player is β-lucky if he is
β-successful, but not β-decisive.
Similar as in [3], given a probability distribution p : I → [0, 1] over all inclination
vectors, and B ∈ B, we define pB = p ◦ B−1 on Cn (probability of the decision vectors).
Furthermore, the group decision function gd : Cn → G assigns to each decision vector
b ∈ Cn the value a ∈ G if the group decision is to choose a.
Moreover, for b ∈ cn, k ∈ N , and a ∈ A \ {bk}, we define bk,a ∈ Cn by
bk,aj =
{
bj if j 6= k
a if j = k
. (42)
Definition 6 Given β, gd ∈ G, pB : Cn → [0, 1], we define for each k ∈ N
– β-Success of player k
SUCβk(gd, pB) := Pr(k is β-successful) =
∑
{b∈Cn||bk−gd(b)|≤β}
pB(b) (43)
– β-Failure of player k
FAILβk(gd, pB) := 1− SUCβk(gd, pB) =
∑
{b∈Cn||bk−gd(b)|>β}
pB(b) (44)
– β-Decisiveness of player k
DECβk(gd, pB) := Pr(k is β-decisive) =
∑
{b∈Cn|β≥|bk−gd(b)|≥|a−gd(bk,a)| ∀a 6=bk}
pB(b) (45)
– β-Luck of player k
LUCKβk(gd, pB) := Pr(k is β-lucky) =
∑
{b∈Cn|β≥|bk−gd(b)|<|a−gd(bk,a)| for some a 6=bk}
pB(b)
(46)
According to [1], the following relation between Success, Luck, and Decisiveness holds:
Success = Decisiveness + Luck
and in our case, we have for each β, k ∈ N , pB, and gd ∈ G
SUCβk(gd, pB) = DEC
β
k(gd, pB) + LUCK
β
k(gd, pB). (47)
Note that β-Success and β-Failure are monotone with respect to β, i.e., for each
k ∈ N , pB, and gd ∈ G
if β > β˜, then SUCβk(gd, pB) ≥ SUCβ˜k(gd, pB) and FAILβk(gd, pB) ≤ FAILβ˜k(gd, pB).
(48)
We have also for each k ∈ N , pB, and gd ∈ G
SUCC
maxa∈C,a′∈G |a−a′|
k (gd, pB) = 1, FAIL
maxa∈C,a′∈G |a−a′|
k (gd, pB) = 0. (49)
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Example 6 We come back to Example 3, and assume that all inclination vectors are
equally probable, that is,
p(i) =
1
27
for each i ∈ I.
The group decision is defined for each b ∈ Cn as:
gd(b) =
{
a if |{k ∈ N | bk = a}| ≥ 2
b1 otherwise.
(50)
which means that if a majority of the committee members chooses the same action, this
action becomes the group decision, and if all three members choose different actions, this
is the director of the lab (player 1) who decides. By virtue of (50) and Table 1, we get
Table 2.
Table 2. The group decision
b ∈ Cn pB(b) gd(b) b ∈ Cn pB(b) gd(b) b ∈ Cn pB(b) gd(b)
(−1,−1,−1) 6/27 −1 (0, 0, 0) 1/27 0 (2, 2, 2) 6/27 2
(−1,−1, 0) 0 −1 (0, 0,−1) 1/27 0 (2, 2,−1) 1/27 2
(−1, 0,−1) 0 −1 (0,−1, 0) 1/27 0 (2,−1, 2) 1/27 2
(0,−1,−1) 1/27 −1 (−1, 0, 0) 0 0 (−1, 2, 2) 1/27 2
(−1,−1, 2) 1/27 −1 (0, 0, 2) 1/27 0 (2, 2, 0) 0 2
(−1, 2,−1) 1/27 −1 (0, 2, 0) 1/27 0 (2, 0, 2) 0 2
(2,−1,−1) 1/27 −1 (2, 0, 0) 0 0 (0, 2, 2) 1/27 2
(−1, 0, 2) 0 −1 (0,−1, 2) 1/27 0 (2,−1, 0) 0 2
(−1, 2, 0) 0 −1 (0, 2,−1) 1/27 0 (2, 0,−1) 0 2
Success, Failure, Decisiveness and Luck for each player and β ∈ {0, 1, 2} are presented
in Table 3.
Table 3. Success, Failure, Decisiveness and Luck
k SUC0k FAIL
0
k DEC
0
k LUCK
0
k SUC
1
k FAIL
1
k DEC
1
k LUCK
1
k SUC
2
k FAIL
2
k DEC
2
k LUCK
2
k
1 23/27 4/27 10/27 13/27 24/27 3/27 10/27 14/27 25/27 2/27 10/27 15/27
2 21/27 6/27 0 21/27 23/27 4/27 1/27 22/27 25/27 2/27 2/27 23/27
3 21/27 6/27 0 21/27 23/27 4/27 1/27 22/27 25/27 2/27 2/27 23/27
6 Conclusions
The main improvement of this paper is to enlarge the set of possible actions in the original
framework of influence in a social network, in which players have only two inclinations
and two possible decisions. While in the original framework only a yes-no decision was
considered, in the present paper we analyze a multi-choice game, where each player has
a totally ordered set of possible actions. A player has an inclination to choose one of
the actions, but due to the influence by the others, his decision may be different from
his inclination. We define the generalized (weighted) influence indices, and distinguish
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several influence indices with particular weights. The positive influence and the negative
influence are measured. To the best of our knowledge, the concept of the generalized
influence indices has not been proposed before. Hence, it is a new and interesting concept
from a theoretical point of view, but also its applicability is worth remarking. Combining
multi-choice problems with influence aspects creates a challenging framework to study.
There are several possibilities for conducting future research on this topic. One of
them is to introduce dynamic aspects into this framework, and to analyze the iteration of
the influence. Another interesting generalization would be to assume that the influence
function B is a probabilistic function. Furthermore, we would like to find an axiomatic
characterization of the influence indices.
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